aaus-list @ ukrainianstudies.org -- [aaus-list] KUCHMA RESIGNING/MELNYCHENKO TAPES/EU ENLARGEMENT

[Taras Kuzio <t.kuzio@utoronto.ca>]

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report
Vol. 4, No. 37, 1 October 2002


UKRAINE

KUCHMA HAS NO INTENTION OF RESIGNING. President Leonid Kuchma
addressed the country on the ICTV television station on 28 September
and accused the opposition of resorting to violence to unseat him.
"It is one thing to express one's dissatisfaction but another
thing to [try to] force a violent change of power and the social
system," the president said. Kuchma called for an end to opposition
protests, saying that previous demonstrations have damaged
Ukraine's image and stall social progress. "[Opposition leaders]
must think about whether to discharge the responsibilities for which
they were elected by some 50 million citizens during the elections or
to execute the demands of close to 50,000 people who participated in
nationwide demonstrations," he noted, adding that "I refuse
categorically to resign...because I was elected by the people as the
head of state, and I feel fully responsible for all that happens in
the country."
    It appears that the Ukrainian president is beginning to
regain the controls of the political situation in the country despite
the two huge antipresidential rallies in Kyiv (16 and 24 September),
as well as numerous, albeit less crowded, protests in the provinces.
There is also no sign that Kuchma has been affected to any degree by
the recent allegations from Washington saying that Ukraine may have
illegally sold a Kolchuga radar system to Iraq, following his
personal authorization.
    Last week, the nine pro-presidential groups in the Verkhovna
Rada -- the Party of Entrepreneurs-Labor Ukraine, Ukraine's
Regions, Social Democratic Party-united, European Choice, Democratic
Initiatives, Popular Democratic Party, Power of the People,
Ukraine's Agrarians, and People's Choice -- announced that
they have created a 226-strong parliamentary majority to "assume the
responsibility for legislative activities and the creation of a
coalition government in accordance with the president's proposals
regarding the implementation of political reform." The practical
operation of such a razor-blade majority (226 is the minimum number
of votes necessary to pass laws) may be very dubious -- as testified
by several abortive votes on legislation in parliament last week --
but its announcement doubtless shows that Kuchma does not intend to
bow to the demands of former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko that a
parliamentary coalition be created around his grouping, Our Ukraine,
which won the most parliamentary seats contested under a proportional
party-list system in the 31 March parliamentary election.
    According to Roman Bezsmertnyy, Our Ukraine's political
coordinator, a viable majority in the Verkhovna Rada should consist
of 270 deputies at minimum. Until now, the opposition Communist
Party, Socialist Party, and Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, as well as Our
Ukraine, have been able to disrupt the work of the parliament by
boycotting votes. But such a tactic seems to play into the hand of
the presidential administration. In his 28 September address, Kuchma
accused the opposition of sabotaging the ongoing parliamentary
session by refusing to participate in voting. He castigated
opposition groups for failing last week to support a law on money
laundering and suggested that Ukraine's international image may
be severely damaged, and international organizations may impose
sanctions against Ukraine, because of this failure. He also lashed
out at opposition legislators for not voting on a bill that would
provide assistance to the families of disabled people. These are
evidently arguments of some populist appeal.
    It seems that Kuchma's primary intention is to persuade
Yushchenko that Our Ukraine -- if not as a whole, then in part --
should join the pro-presidential majority and provide necessary
support for legislative activities of the Verkhovna Rada. Mykhaylo
Pohrebynskyy, a political analyst with links to the presidential
administration, told the "Ukrayinska pravda" website how Yushchenko
could make such a move toward Kuchma. "[Yushchenko] could create two
factions on the basis of his megafaction [Our Ukraine]," Pohrebynskyy
noted. "One faction could be more resolute and consistent in pursuing
[Our Ukraine's] opposition line. The other could be more prone to
compromise and ready for more active cooperation." According to
Pohrebynskyy, the "radical part" of Our Ukraine could "preserve room
to maneuver for Yushchenko, and he would not have to go between
[Yuliya] Tymoshenko, [Oleksandr] Moroz, [Petro] Symonenko, and
Kuchma, but would be able to move among his own people."
    It is for Yushchenko to judge whether he wants to join a
majority in which he will not play the main role, as well as whether
such a scheme will not actually mean a split within Our Ukraine. But
it is also obvious that the time for making his crucial political
choice -- moving to the radical antipresidential opposition or
joining the pro-presidential coalition -- is already ripe. Any
further wavering and maneuvering on the part of Ukraine's most
popular politician may be fraught with grave losses of his current
and/or future allies. (Jan Maksymiuk)

THE CONTINUING SAGA OVER THE 'KUCHMAGATE' TAPES. Last
week's decision by Washington to block some $55 million in
previously approved aid to Kyiv over suspicions that Ukraine may have
illegally sold Iraq Kolchuga radar systems capable of helping bring
down U.S. aircraft has once again placed the so-called "Kuchmagate"
scandal in the international spotlight (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 24
September 2002). The U.S. Department of Justice authenticated a
section of Mykola Melnychenko's tape recordings in which
President Leonid Kuchma appears to have authorized the sale of four
Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq. Since the illegal-sale allegations
have become a very serious problem in the current U.S.-Ukrainian
relations, it appears advisable to recapitulate the main stages of
the prolonged Kuchmagate case to readers of "RFE/RL's Poland,
Belarus, and Ukraine Report."
    In November 2000, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz
first unveiled to parliament a portion of tapes made in President
Kuchma's office by one of his security guards, Melnychenko. This
portion of the tapes revealed a conversation between Kuchma;
Volodymyr Lytvyn, then-head of the presidential administration and
currently parliamentary speaker; and Interior Minister Yuriy
Kravchenko, about opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, the editor
in chief of the Internet publication "Ukrayinska pravda."
    The first reaction of the authorities was to deny the
authenticity of the tapes themselves and even the existence of
Melnychenko, who had by then fled Ukraine for Prague. The authorities
also consistently denied it was possible to bug Kuchma's office
and ridiculed the suggestion that a digital tape recorder was placed
under his couch.
    It was not until a video interview of Melnychenko was
broadcast in parliament that it was confirmed that he was a member of
the Security Service unit responsible for protecting high-ranking
officials, such as Kuchma. The illegal search by customs officers of
the opposition deputies who brought back the videotape was also
suspicious. What did the authorities have to hide if the tapes were
not authentic?
    Slowly, the official view changed away from total denial of
the authenticity of the tapes. One reason was because opposition
deputies began to acknowledge their voices on the tapes. Eventually,
Kuchma himself accepted that his voice was to be found on the tapes
but claimed that Melnychenko had spliced different portions of the
tapes to incriminate him. This had remained the official version
concerning the tapes until recently.
    Calls by opposition deputies to interview Melnychenko and to
use the tapes as part of an investigation into the criminal deeds
discussed on them were always refused by former Prosecutor-General
Mykhaylo Potebenko. This in itself was also suspicious. Melnychenko
offered to take a lie-detector test to prove the tapes were genuine.
Instead of dealing with the tapes and the issues they raised, the
authorities swept the whole issue under the rug, hoping it would go
away.
    Time, however, was working against them. One of the first
causes for doubting the sincerity of the authorities was the fiasco
surrounding FBI experts invited to Ukraine in April of this year to
investigate the Gongadze murder. The FBI agents went home
empty-handed, as they were denied access to evidence.
    Most of the Ukrainian elites accept that the tapes are
genuine. Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko claims he never
doubted their authenticity from the time they were first offered to
him on 11 November 2000. Nevertheless, the Communists think along
similar lines to the oligarchs and Kuchma that the taping was part of
a U.S.-backed plot.
    The Ukrainian position on the tapes did not budge when BEK
TEK, a specialist firm that provides authentication services to the
FBI and the U.S. Supreme Court, began to authenticate sections of the
tapes provided by Melnychenko. BEK TEK confirmed that no sections had
been spliced together, as Kuchma claimed. BEK TEK's
authentication was insufficient for the Ukrainian authorities, as it
was undertaken by a private company. In a similar manner, a test of
the tapes made by the Vienna Press Institute early on in the
Kuchmagate crisis was also ignored.
    Over the course of this year, the Ukrainian authorities have
been forced gradually to change their attitude toward the tapes. In
August, the newly appointed prosecutor-general, Svyatoslav Piskun,
ordered a test abroad of the tape dealing with Gongadze. This was
coupled with new autopsies of Gongadze's decapitated body and an
admission that his murder was political, something the authorities
had always denied.
    The Ukrainian authorities have been mainly forced to change
their attitudes to the tapes through international pressure. For
example, they have continued to deny that Kolchuga radar systems were
ever dispatched to Iraq in contravention of the United Nations arms
embargo. After the United States undertook its own official tests and
officially announced their results on 24 September, the Ukrainian
authorities could no longer deny that the portion of the tapes where
Kuchma is heard authorizing the sale is not genuine. Whether the
Kolchugas are in Iraq is still to be determined. Nevertheless, all
sides now agree that Kuchma authorized their sale.
    Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko has now admitted
that Kuchma's office could have been bugged after all. What will
Ukraine's next retreat be? The United States has admitted that
its authentication of the tape dealing with Iraq will color their
views of other portions of the tapes, e.g., one portion relates to
Kuchma apparently lying to the United States about former Prime
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Melnychenko is to be a witness in the
Lazarenko trial and the United States will therefore be conducting
further official tests of other portions. Will Ukraine backtrack each
time an official result is announced by the United States?
    Since the Kuchmagate crisis began in November 2000, the
authorities have not been honest or forthright regarding the tapes
and have refused to investigate the serious allegations arising from
them. Only international pressure has forced them to shift
begrudgingly from total denial to selective denial (the tapes are
genuine but spliced together) and now acceptance that some of them
have not been tampered with.
    Instead of dealing with the issues raised on the taped
conversations, the authorities' gut reaction was to initiate
legal action against Melnychenko and to accuse him of "treason" and
"espionage." The tapes allegedly include state secrets, which
Melnychenko accepts, but the Ukrainian authorities argue, therefore,
that none of them should be released. Melnychenko and the authorities
disagree over the definition of "state secrets." Melnychenko sticks
to the traditional definition of "state secrets," which deals with
foreign countries (issues pertaining to Russia, Britain, Germany,
Israel, Spain, and Turkey are on the tapes). The Ukrainian
authorities have a broader definition that includes all of the
activities undertaken by Kuchma that were taped, including corrupt
ones.
    The sharp reaction of the authorities to the tape scandal
reflects their incredulity that they could be caught red-handed. The
lack of transparency in the executive, the sense of infallibility
that the authorities would never be caught, and the unclear dividing
line between the authorities and the state were all severely damaged
by the tapes. Thus, the authorities are demonstrating an
unwillingness to come clean and initiate an impartial investigation.
(Taras Kuzio)

BEYOND ENLARGEMENT: THE EU AND WIDER EUROPE. The imminence of eastern
enlargement is compelling the European Union to address the issue of
relations with its future "direct neighbors" to the east, i.e.,
Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. While the EU has a clear-cut strategy
on the Balkans, embodied by the Stabilization and Association
Process, which offers the prospect of EU membership, the EU has up
until recently given the distinct impression of not knowing how to
deal with Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. The long-overdue process of
devising a set of appropriate long-term policies and instruments was
finally embarked on by the union in spring 2002. However, this is
proving to be a troublesome task.
    While the EU is keen to promote stability and prosperity in
its direct neighborhood, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova have expressed
diverse aspirations vis-a-vis the EU: Relations with Belarus have all
but broken down; Moldova, while expressing an interest in EU
membership, is continuing to undergo internal turmoil; and Ukraine,
despite being far from eligible for membership, is uncomfortably
insistent on being offered the mere prospect of membership at some
unspecified time in the future.
    This insistence finds its roots in 1994 when Ukraine
enthusiastically signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
with the union, the first among the post-Soviet states to do so. In
some respects, the agreement, which is valid for 10 years, resembled
the association agreements signed between Central and Eastern
European states and the EU, which provided the legal framework and
instruments for cooperation in a number of areas, including energy,
trade, environment, and transportation. However, in contrast to the
association agreements, the PCA did not offer the prospect of EU
membership. Yet, in 1996, President Kuchma made explicit
Ukraine's intention to join the EU and in June 1998, a strategy
on Ukraine's integration with the European Union was adopted by
presidential decree, formally establishing Ukraine's membership
in the EU as a long-term strategic goal. A more detailed program for
Ukraine's integration with the EU was adopted in June 2000.
    Ukraine's declarations did not go down well either in
Brussels or in the capitals of EU member states. While the EU had
embarked on protracted negotiations with candidate states, it
persistently refused to offer any prospect of membership for Ukraine
and Moldova. This is because the EU believes that rapprochement with,
rather than membership for, these eastern states is sufficient for
managing the "soft" security issues emanating from the region.
Instead, the EU set about providing a framework for relations with
Ukraine by adopting a common strategy on Ukraine at the Helsinki
summit in December 1999, which cautiously "acknowledges Ukraine's
European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's pro-European choice,"
but went no further than that, much to Kyiv's chagrin. The common
strategy signaled that while Ukraine was important enough to the EU
to merit a purpose-made document, it was not important enough to
justify the introduction of potentially binding commitments.
    In light of the retrogression that has taken place in
Ukrainian politics since the late 1990s, not only has the EU's
stance on Ukraine been vindicated, but many in the EU have also begun
to view Ukraine as a hopeless case. Yet ironically, at the same time,
Kyiv has flooded EU capitals with a series of initiatives for
tightening cooperation, the only effect of which has been a sense of
"Ukraine fatigue" in the EU. The failure of Ukrainian officials to
get the attention of their Western counterparts is beginning to
elicit a sense that Ukraine is being excluded from "EU-Europe."
    To counter this problem, the EU is currently in the process
of devising a more comprehensive strategy and a set of more clearly
articulated goals. A joint paper titled "Wider Europe," written by
Christopher Patten of the European Commission and Javier Solana, the
EU's foreign-policy and security chief, outlines ideas for the
EU's relations with its future neighbors. While relations are to
be based on a shared set of political and economic values, the
"one-size-fits-all" approach is deemed inappropriate. At the same
time, however, clear limits are to be put on relations with eastern
neighbors, limits that will "stop short of full membership or
creating shared institutions" (other than for the Balkans). Ukraine
is singled out as meriting "a more concrete recognition of [its]
European aspiration," yet, significantly, "without closing any
options for the more distant future." The paper proposes that Ukraine
and Moldova be offered a new form of "proximity agreements"
accompanied by a new kind of "proximity instrument," which would
overcome the limitations of the Tacis program.
    In sum, the recognition of Ukraine's and Moldova's
European aspirations are finally beginning to take on a tangible
format. But it remains to be seen, first, how far the EU will take
this initiative and, second, how satisfied Moldova and Ukraine will
be with it. The EU has to strike a balance between responding to the
challenges arising from enlargement and the "needs arising from the
newly created borders of the union." The latter has resulted in
efforts on securing and hardening EU borders in order to make them
impermeable to soft security threats emanating from the east. This
stance has dominated the Justice and Home Affairs agenda of the EU
irrespective of the implications for countries on the other side of
the new border. This is amply exemplified by the EU's insistence
on the introduction of a visa regime for Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,
and Russia, despite the hardship it will invariably cause.
    The chances are that Ukraine, in particular, will be
disappointed by "Wider Europe." Despite the positive stance of the
document, anything short of acknowledging Ukraine's prospect for
EU membership tends to be seen by Kyiv as a distinctly second-best
option serving only to intensify Ukraine's suspicion that the EU
takes a real interest only in countries that it sees as future
members. Underlying the above is Ukraine's primary fear, namely
that any window of opportunity for membership will close upon the
2004 enlargement.
    Despite efforts to put relations on a new footing and promote
stability on its eastern border, the EU may still fail to nurture
Moldova's and Ukraine's "European choice." It is therefore in
danger of contributing to instability on its new eastern border, in
spite of all its growing concerns.
    (This report was written by Kasia Wolczuk, lecturer at the
Centre for Russian and East European Studies, the University of
Birmingham, and at present Jean Monnet fellow, the European
University Institute, Florence, and by Roman Wolczuk, researcher on
Ukrainian foreign and security policy. They are the authors of
"Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?"
(London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, forthcoming
October 2002.)

QUOTE OF THE WEEK.

"Only those who are not sufficiently informed about with whom we are
being proposed to conduct this dialogue may believe in some soft
forms of dialogue with the authorities. When people say the word
'authorities' in civilized societies, they mean parliament,
government, [and the] president. As for Ukraine, there is only one
authority: Leonid Danylovych Kuchma." -- Our Ukraine's political
coordinator, Roman Bezsmertnyy, in an interview published by the
"Ukrayinska pravda" website on 27 September.

(Compiled by Jan Maksymiuk)
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Copyright (c) 2002. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

"RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report" is prepared by Jan
Maksymiuk on the basis of a variety of sources including reporting by
"RFE/RL Newsline" and RFE/RL's broadcast services. It is distributed
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