aaus-list @ ukrainianstudies.org -- [aaus-list] KUCHMA's STRATEGY

[Taras Kuzio <t.kuzio@utoronto.ca>]

OXFORD ANALYTICA, EAST EUROPE DAILY BRIEF, 3 SEPTEMBER 2002.

Taras Kuzio


UKRAINE:  Presidential Ploys

EVENT:  Opposition parties begin joint protests on September 16, aimed at
bringing down the government.

SIGNIFICANCE:  The president has formed a parliamentary majority despite
winning a smaller percentage of the vote at the March 31 parliamentary
elections than the opposition, but his position is insecure, his government
is unpopular and he faces an opposition campaign to unseat him.

ANALYSIS:  President Leonid Kuchma¹s strategy is to reverse the poor
electoral result in March in order to ensure the smooth transfer of power in
October 2004 to a chosen successor.  However, there is much dissatisfaction
with his administration:  according to an August public opinion poll, 72%
want him to resign and 52% want him impeached.  On September 16, the second
anniversary of the disappearance of opposition journalist Giorgii Gongadze
(see EEDB, February 6, 2001, II), four opposition groups and the ŒUkraine
Without Kuchma¹ youth movement plan mass demonstrations calling for Kuchma¹s
resignation and early presidential elections.  Kuchma¹s strategy has five
components.  

1.  Opposition.  The authorities are attempting to divide the opposition
between Œradical¹ and Œconstructive¹ components.  They are trying to
neutralise the former -- Yulia Tymoshenko¹s bloc and the Socialist Party --
with allegations of corruption.  The case against Tymoshenko was first
opened when she was deputy prime minister in the Yushchenko government in
charge of energy reform.  First her husband was arrested, and then she
herself in February 2001.  Tymoshenko was eventually released and after the
March elections all charges were dropped.  The case was re-opened in August,
and the aim is now to strip Tymoshenko of parliamentary immunity ahead of
the 16 September protests.  A pro-presidential majority in parliament makes
this a possibility.

Meanwhile, the government is trying to woo the Œconstructive opposition¹ --
Our Ukraine and the Communists.  There are still many businessmen and former
government officials (such as former Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko,
head of one wing of Rukh) who are willing to compromise with Kuchma.
However, pressure from various government agencies on Our Ukraine
businessmen and pro-Yushchenko Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko, together
with attempts at ignoring Our Ukraine¹s triumph in the March elections, are
pushing moderates into the radical camp.  Our Ukraine is to hold a meeting
on September 15, and will take part in the demonstrations the following day
separately from the Œradicals¹.  The Communists have a record of cooperating
with Kuchma, most notably when they joined with pro-presidential factions to
bring the Yushchenko government down on April 16, 2001 (see EEDB, May 2,
2001, II).  The Communists are supporting opposition protests but are afraid
of Yushchenko¹s popularity because he is pro-Western.  The Communists were
more popular when corrupt, economically incompetent oligarchs led Ukraine.

2.  Coopting parliament.  The pro-presidential bloc has grown steadily since
March, winning over many independents and business people in opposition
factions (see EEDB, June 5, 2002, I).  When parliament re-opens on September
3, Kuchma expects to control 228 votes, giving him a slim majority in the
450-seat parliament.  A pro-presidential majority is important as the 2004
elections approach, not only to pass legislation proposed by the president,
but also to prevent impeachment proceedings.  Kuchma will present this as a
Œconstructive¹ relationship between the executive and the legislature.

With a parliamentary majority, Kuchma is unconcerned by proposals for
political reform, transferring power from the presidency to parliament.
Kuchma previously backed a Russian-style presidential republic.  On August
24, in his Independence Day address, he came out for a parliamentary system
-- after a pro-presidential majority had been secured.  Reducing the powers
of the president is also a good move for Kuchma, to stop Yushchenko winning
the 2004 elections.  To change the constitution, two thirds of deputies need
to vote in favour.  The Communists have said that they are willing to
provide the required majority.  The changes also envisage parliament -- not
the Ukrainian electorate -- electing the next president, which would ensure
that the pro-Kuchma majority would control the succession.

3.  New Œparty of power¹.  All the pro-presidential blocs and parties lack
substance except the Kyiv clan¹s United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
(SDPUO), which is the new Œparty of power¹, replacing For a United Ukraine
(ZYU), which has disintegrated into regional clans.  The SDPUO gained the
most from the 2002 elections, despite winning only 6.3% of the vote, and is
ascendant.  The main architect of Kuchma¹s 2004 strategy is party leader
Viktor Medvedchuk, newly appointed head of the presidential administration,
the only oligarch with the popular support to challenge Yushchenko. SDPUO
loyalists are replacing the heads of local administrations.  As the only
oligarch party able to stand in elections independently thanks to its
well-developed organisation and control of television, the SDPUO was the
only such party that supported a fully proportional election law (which all
opposition groups also support).  Having vetoed this law five times in 2001,
Kuchma now backs it, as it will come into effect in 2006, two years after he
leaves office.  

4.  Image building.  The SDPUO made use in the March elections of Gleb
Pavlovsky¹s Fund for Effective Politics (FEP), Russian President Vladimir
Putin¹s image maker.  FEP has established a Ukrainian branch, the Centre for
Effective Politics (CEP), led by Mykhailo Pogrybynsky, whose think tank, the
Centre for Conflict and Political Studies, has long worked for the SDPUO.
The aims of the FEP and CEP are to improve Kuchma¹s image, presenting him as
a compassionate leader, reacting promptly for example to the Lviv air show
tragedy in July (see EEDB, August 8, 2002, I), the recent coal mining
accidents (see EEDB, August 28, 2002, I), and popular concerns about low
wages and pensions, and high medical costs.  Solving the Gongadze case,
while deflecting blame from Kuchma, has become a priority.  The authorities
recently hinted that death squads composed of police officers and criminals
might have murdered Gongadze.

A number of presidential decrees have been issued aiming to increase the
transparency and accountability of officials.  In August the CEP helped
develop a new web site for the president, in a policy recalling former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev¹s glasnost, or openness.  This policy
faces an uphill struggle.  The August public opinion poll found that about
90-92% of Ukrainians believe that they have no influence over local and
central authorities, and 91% believe that human rights are regularly
infringed.  Although the economy has been growing since 2000, 81% feel that
their standard of living has declined since 1990 and only 12% believe that
Ukraine¹s economic performance will continue to improve.

5.  Russian Support.  Russia is actively involved in supporting Kuchma¹s
strategy.  During the March elections Russian officials openly attacked the
Œanti-Russian¹ Our Ukraine and backed pro-Kuchma forces.  The FEP backed the
SDPUO in the elections as a Œpro-Russian¹ force and has assisted in the
creation of the CEP, the architect of Kuchma¹s new policy of glasnost.
Since 2001, Russia has synchronised corruption charges against the Russian
defence minister¹s former chief financial officer, Georgy Oleinik, with the
Tymoshenko case, as they are accused of conspiring to act corruptly.

CONCLUSION:  Kuchma¹s strategy should prevent an impeachment and split the
opposition, whose campaign is unlikely to unseat him or lead to early
elections.  However, the strategy would not ensure that a successor was
elected from the pro-Kuchma oligarchs in 2004, if it was by popular vote.
Kuchma is likely to try to secure the election of a well-disposed successor
by changing the constitution so that parliament elects the president.

Keywords:EE, Ukraine, Russia, politics, constitution, election, government,
legislation, opposition, party, reform