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For a PDF version of this article, click here.
Ukraine at Ten: Freedom
of Expression Goes from Dismal to Dangerous
by Vanessa von
Struensee
email: vvonstruen@post.harvard.edu
Fulbright Law Professor Ukraine 2000-2001
"Liberty has never come from the
government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of
it."
--Woodrow Wilson
Introduction
While working in Ukraine as a Fulbright Law Scholar last year, 2000-2001, I witnessed the state of press freedom go from dismal to dangerous. If forewarned is forearmed, I should have known right off the bat. My first days in Donetsk, the Eastern part of Ukraine, after proposing a human rights law course, I was told by a junior law faculty member (although she had not yet received her law degree, by virtue of belonging to the small group of law faculty who spoke English, and being the girlfriend of the Dean for International Affairs, she was given inordinate power, Internet access, most of the international conference travel, and most of the British and American grants, while many deserving students and faculty got nothing, nor did she share knowledge on how to apply for these opportunities) that "human rights is stupid." This comment came after she had just taken advantage of an all expense paid trip to Strasbourg courtesy of some Western Fund to learn about human rights. She and her cohorts also engaged in relentless anti-American remarks to the point where I wondered why they had invited us. They made it clear they were milking Western programs while waiting for the time when they could reunify with Russia and return to the glory days. My colleagues in Ternopil, the Western part of Ukraine, however, greeted me and my ideas with open arms. The Donetsk Law Faculty had invited me there to make them eligible for more US program funding, to perform their obligations on various foreign-funded programs which they were not qualified to do themselves, and to coach their students on international competitions (but not be invited to the competition to watch the students we had coached). Fed up with their exploitation and the futility of politeness and deference to this sort of administration, I insisted on teaching the course anyway. Which I did. It was well attended. The political backdrop of my course is described below, and it still puzzles me how anyone living in such a context could have dismissed human rights as "stupid". I realize that many Ukrainians understandably value second generation economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights. Yet my faculty hosts seemed only interested in lining their own purses, and their objection to my course was nothing less than their solidarity with an administration we would be discussing and with whom they were probably networked. They did not know of nor care about the difference between first- or second-generation human rights.
The author (right), with a law professor of the National University of Donetsk.
Freedom of Expression: Key Human Rights Issue in Ukraine
Upon my arrival in Ukraine, the most pressing human rights issue was freedom of the press. Although there are a number and variety of media outlets in Ukraine, attempts to manipulate their content by the administration of President Leonid Kuchma, his political rivals, local officials, and related business networks renders press freedom illusory in the country. In recent years the right to freedom of expression, particularly media freedom, has come under increased pressure from the Ukrainian authorities. Editors of independent newspapers and television companies have complained of being repeatedly subjected to tax audits as well as health, sanitary, and other pretextual inspections by the authorities in an apparent attempt to stifle their journalism, a fact reportedly acknowledged by the Ukrainian Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson, Nina Karpacheva.[2] "In the past year, Kuchma and his people have imposed very tough restrictions on the press," said Gennadiy Potchtar, head of ProMedia, an organization with some US-government funding that helps train local journalists. "You write positive stuff on the president, or you don't write. They wanted to eliminate such criticism. Even small papers were shut down." This statement was echoed by many journalists and academics that I met.
Ukrainian authorities have resorted to trumped up charges of criminal libel on a significant number of occasions in order to quash critical journalism.[3] In addition to the pretextual intimidation described above, press freedom is also curtailed through harassment and intimidation where journalists are physically attacked, sometimes resulting in death. Over the years, several Ukrainian journalists who were investigating corruption have died mysteriously.[1]
The Murder of Journalist
Georgiy Gongadze
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Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze (above) is believed to have been killed at the order of President Leonid Kuchma. Photo courtesy Ukrainska Pravda. |
The Chernobyl nuclear plant - site of the worst nuclear accident in history in 1986 - was shut down for good in the Fall of 2000 during my stay in Donetsk. But the murder of a young Ukrainian journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, overshadowed this development, raising grave concerns about Ukraine's commitment to a free press, respect for the rule of law, and for human rights. Gongadze primarily published on the Internet. In the spring of 2000, he founded the website Ukrainska Pravda, where he exposed cases of Ukrainian government corruption.[4] As a result, he had been barred from official press conferences. In the summer of 2000, he officially complained to the police about being followed. On September 15, 2000, Gongadze disappeared. That same day, the journalist Oleg Yeltsov, who had recently published an article in Ukrainska Pravda, was harassed by the Ukrainian police. After investigating the case, the Paris-based Reporters without Borders expressed "certitude" that Gongadze had been kidnapped for his journalistic work.[5] The crisis began in the November of 2000, when journalists, acting on a tip, identified a headless corpse in a village morgue outside Kiev as that of Gongadze. The Ukrainian Procurator's Office, however, seems to have decided in advance that the motives of Gongadze's kidnappers and murderers did not require or warrant any investigation.
Why would a government go out of its way not to investigate a murder? The explanation arrived on Nov. 28, 2000, when the Socialist Party leader and respected politician, Oleksander Moroz, made public an audio tape of secretly recorded conversations in the President's office that link Kuchma to the murder. Transcripts of several conversations apparently between Kuchma, his interior minister, and his chief of staff were revealed. The voice attributed to Kuchma discusses ways of getting rid of the insolent Gongadze - including handing him over to Chechen gangs. "I'm telling you, drive him out, throw [him] out. Give him to the Chechens," Kuchma says on the tape. Kuchma asks why journalists don't fear the intimidation tactics of the security services. "That Gongadze ... good bye, good riddance," it says on the tape.[7]
My human rights seminar turned to the topic of the allegations of President Kuchma's involvement in the "disappearance" of Georgiy Gongadze. The allegations were met with cynical acceptance of a 'that is more or less routine here' attitude from my jaded law students. Their attitude showed me why the ensuing failure of the Ukrainian authorities to promptly and impartially investigate this incident had resulted in more international than domestic concern. The revelations that senior government officials were responsible for Gongadze's death did not have a visible impact on the Ukrainian populace either. There were some protests in Kiev, from "Ukraine without Kuchma" and other opposition groups, but none in Donetsk, where I lived. As the case proceeded, it was remarkable how the Ukrainian justice system and police did their utmost to obstruct justice and thwart any investigation. The Commission of Inquiry created by the impotent Ukrainian Parliament[6] was refused the resources necessary to carry out its investigation. Clearly, despite placating promises, neither the prosecutor's office nor the Ministry of the Interior intended any serious investigation into Gongadze's abduction and murder.
The Georgiy Gongadze question was taken up by international bodies.[8] In two Resolutions adopted in January 2001 and April 2001 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed concern about the failure of the Ukrainian authorities to investigate the incident, stating: "[t]he measures taken by the Ukrainian authorities and the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) to investigate the disappearance of the journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, and their efforts to do justice to all parties involved, should be considered a test for the freedom of expression and the functioning of parliamentary democracy in Ukraine. The Assembly voices its concern over the drawn-out manner in which the General Prosecutor's office of Ukraine has handled this matter."[9] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on the Ukrainian authorities to "... conduct an expeditious, full and transparent investigation into the disappearance or death of Mr. Gongadze, and to make known the results of this investigation as quickly as possible" and "...bring to justice those responsible for committing this crime".[10]These recommendations were repeated in April 2001, urging the Ukrainian authorities to take all necessary measures to discourage attacks and threats against journalists and other media representatives.[11]
At the time of this writing, December 2001, Kuchma is still in office. The protests, after all, were from a relatively small number of citizens, most seem to react as my law students did, with a sense of futility and passivity bred and compounded by a long-standing secretive and authoritarian Soviet political culture. I myself was exposed to this culture in the context of bureaucratic delays and power games when disfavored for some act or omission I committed at my host institution. The administration even took the law books I personally gave to my students away from them and refused to give them back, despite my involving the U. S. Embassy's cultural attache, who funded this administration, on the student's behalf. To be born and raised with such tactics, with food and employment at stake for nonconformity, would indeed defeat most people's propensity to protest. Indeed, there is much more that needs to be done to empower or even create civil society in Ukraine. With few exceptions what is currently passing for civil society in Ukraine are hand-picked "insider" groups with English-speaking ability who enjoy favored relations with funders and international agencies, or Ukrainian employees of such organizations, who neither share their knowledge nor seek to empower other Ukrainians outside their clique. This state of affairs explains the passivity of the Ukrainian people as their government repeatedly adds insult to injury in far more than the Gongadze scandal. It explains how the Ukrainian government could repeatedly advance crackpot explanations concerning Gongadze with impunity.
After initially casting doubt on the authenticity of the voices and on the possibility that a recording device could have been planted in the president's office, the Ukrainian authorities finally conceded that the voices on the tapes were authentic, and in fact belong to Kuchma, the interior minister (Kravchenko), the head of the State Security Service (Leonid Derkach), the head of the Tax Inspection Agency (Mykola Azarov), and the presidential chief of staff (Volodymyr Lytvyn).[12]
The Ukrainian government then advanced the defense that these conversations were doctored and purposely edited to create a false and incriminating dialogue. The tapes' explicit conversations confirm that the "power structures" (silovi struktury) -- the government ministries -- are being used by Kuchma to intimidate political opponents, judges, and journalists. The investigation of the audio tapes linking Kuchma to the murder scandal was obviously infected with corruption and obstruction of justice as well. On February 8, Deputy Serhiy Holovaty announced that he had sent the "original recordings," made by Kuchma's former presidential security guard Mykola Melnychenko, who leaked them to the International Press Institute in Vienna. According to parliamentary sources, one set of Melnychenko's recordings was being kept by the special parliamentary committee for the examination of the Gongadze case. Melnychenko claimed there were about 1,000 hours of digital recordings, which he had allegedly been making since 1998. Meanwhile, Melnychenko expanded his allegations beyond the Gongadze case. In an interview with the New York Times, on February 26, 2000 Melnychenko alleged that Kuchma embezzled at least $1 billion in national funds "for personal or political use." Melnychenko was charged with libel and forgery by the Ukrainian government.
Verification of the two main elements of the Gongadze case, the headless body and the incriminating tapes, remains unresolved in the eyes of the Ukraine Chief Justice Office (UCJO). Two legal loopholes are used by the UCJO to stick to its questionable verdict. The body cannot be 100% confirmed, as to its identity, the UCJO argues, until the missing head is found. The tape authenticity cannot be confirmed, without the original tape. The original tape was tested outside of Ukraine, and returning it to the discredited UCJO is unlikely. Using these two loopholes, the UCJO justifies its refusal to commence a formal Criminal Investigation on the Gongadze case. This way, the UCJO washes its hands and does nothing further. This lack of investigation is itself a violation of human rights.[13]
While I was trying to grapple with the dimensions of the Gongadze case for Ukraine, and for my students, another crisis occurred: the ousting, perhaps also engineered by Kuchma, of the very popular prime minister Viktor Yushchenko.[14] Before his appointment as prime minister in late 1999, Yushchenko had been the chairman of Ukraine's Central Bank. His reform-oriented policies in both positions were credited with curbing inflation and currency devaluation, and reviving the slow-paced economic reforms, as well as achieving the first signs of economic progress, including the first GDP growth in independent Ukraine's history.[15]
On April 26, 2001, the fifteenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the Ukrainian Parliament voted, 263 to 69 with 24 abstentions, to approve the resolution accusing Yushchenko's cabinet of "failing to improve the economy and leading the country to ruin" and expressing "no confidence" in the government. The no-confidence vote was supported by the Communist Party, Labor Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party (United), the Democratic Union, Ukraine's Regions caucus, the Green Party, the Popular Democratic Party, and the Yabloko group.[16]
Kuchma, reportedly worried by Yushchenko's popularity, both with the general public and among opposition leaders, puppeteered Yushchenko's ouster.[17] The government's ouster became possible because of the formation of an unprecedented antigovernment coalition uniting strange bedfellows: the leftist block of the Communist and Progressive Socialist parties who had consistently criticized the Yushchenko's government for pursuing "anti-popular" policies and for abiding by IMF requirements--united with the pro-presidential coalition of parties representing the interests of business tycoons, the Ukrainian oligarchs, who considered the reformist, anti-corruption policies of Yushchenko's cabinet a serious threat to their business interests. The situation was further complicated by Yushchenko's popularity. He was Ukraine's most trusted politician according to some polls. He was supported by those who were demanding Kuchma's ouster for the death of Gongadze. It is difficult to assess the economic and political consequences of Yushchenko's ouster. Western analysts and diplomats expressed concern that it might result in an end to the current reformist policies.[18]
Clearly, the ouster further demonstrates the lack of a strong civil society[19] in Ukraine.[20] Donors and policy-makers in Ukraine must come to realize that nascent democratic institutions in transitional phases are fragile, and that market forces alone are inadequate to ensure social and economic equity without the countervailing participation of civil society in the decision-making process. More must be done to foster civil society in Ukraine. Enhancing the role of civil society in demanding accountability from government "involves the most basic questions about power, transparency, participation and democracy". The top-down and closed structure of state-controlled and autocratic governments in Ukraine has stunted the growth of civil society and permitted public officials to operate in an atmosphere devoid of public accountability or transparency.
JUSTICE
AS TRAVESTY, POWER TRIP, AND FARCE
After taking the back seat to Yushchenko for a few weeks, the Gongadze scandal resumed its status as a top story in the headlines in the foreign presses in Ukraine. Reliably, the Ukrainian government raised doubts, week after week, about the identity of the Gongadze body and any other minutiae that would raise doubt--reasonable or not. United States experts concluded that the body was of Gongadze. Gongadze's wife received an official death certificate for her husband. On April 13, 2001 the U. S. State Department announced that Washington had granted asylum to Melnychenko, as well as to Gongadze's wife and two daughters. [21]On April 14, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry summoned the US ambassador, Carlos Pascual, (below with author) to Kiev, expressing displeasure and demanding an explanation.[22]
Protests (below) demanding Kuchma's ouster began. I heard nothing of this in Donetsk and learned about it all through the Internet. The protesters' demands were for Kuchma's ouster as well as that of Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko and Security Service chief Leonid Derkach.[23]
Kuchma eventually fired his two henchmen.[24] One of the most incredible moves was when Ukraine's Interior Minister advanced the crackpot statement that the murder of Gongadze had been solved. Georgiy Gongadze, he stated, was murdered by two underworld figures who had since been killed themselves. Well, how convenient. Smirnov said that law enforcement agents had found the killers' bodies along with a map locating Gongadze's remains. The murderers of Gongadze, it was explained, had links with an underworld boss known as Cyclops. "This is just another attempt to snuff out the scandal," Alyona Pritula, editor-in-chief of Gongadze's Internet newspaper Ukrainska Pravda, told Agence France-Presse. "How could the murderers confess to the murder if they were already dead?" Andry Fedur, a lawyer for Gongadze's mother, said. At about the same time, my human rights course ended in Donetsk, which is a story of its own.[25]
THE DISMAL STATE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN UKRAINE
Participants of my human-rights law
seminar in Ukraine, which included both professors and law
students, unanimously concluded that the human rights
situation in Ukraine is deplorable. Elite ruling gangs
parties in control of state organs in Ukraine ruthlessly
manipulate elections[26]
and crush legitimate opposition groups.[27]
Diplomats and the U. S. Congress .[27.5]avoid
too many human rights confrontations with the Ukrainians for
fear of alienating Ukrainian leaders and pushing them toward
Russia.[28]
Few citizens dare speak out against any authorities for fear
of retaliation. A state-manipulated referendum with
questionable legitimacy in Ukraine weakened the
Parliament,[29]
and political crimes are not resolved by the
courts.[30]
One of my best students confided to me that the reason he,
like many other students, stays on year after year working
for a less than mentoring university official is because
otherwise he would be drafted into the Ukrainian Army, whose
widespread abuses are documented by Amnesty International.
Women's rights have a long way to go in Ukraine. Sex
trafficking is a huge problem, and the AIDS epidemic is
growing faster in Eastern Europe, including in Ukraine, than
in any other region worldwide, according to a November 29,
2001 report by UNAIDS.
Most Ukrainians know nothing about AIDS, and the
health effects of promiscuity, alcohol, drug abuse, and
tobacco use. Health campaigns are
nonexistent.[31]
A POWER MURDER SUCCEEDS AS
CONTROL STRATEGY
As of this writing, there is still a cloud of scandal over Kuchma, but that cloud is dissipating.[33] Valery Pustovoitenko, a top government official, says he will reveal new information on the killing of Gongadze after parliamentary elections next March 2002. Kuchma said Pustovoitenko's statement was groundless and politically motivated. In other words, nothing is going to change for quite some time.
President Leonid Kuchma in November 2001 denounced the parliament and its refusal to amend the constitution for his benefit.[34] This shows a strengthening of Kuchma's position since the peak of the Gongadze tapes scandal,[35] which temporarily weakened his position vis-a-vis parliamentary deputies.
Kuchma has used his blackmail and autocratic power to control and silence the country's oppositional powers, seduce Ukraine's business sector and to resurrect his presidency.[36] The momentum from the Gongadze situation has dissipated and will have to be picked up internationally to carry on. Reporters sans frontieres (RSF), together with Mrs. Alexandra Gongadze, the mother of Georgiy Gongadze, and Miroslava Gongadze, his widow, called for the creation of an international commission of inquiry on the assassination of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze in September 2001. Non-governmental organizations and influential people involved in defending human rights are urged to support this call. The Ukrainian presidency is presently untouchable. As Tammy Lynch put it, "in Ukraine popularity does not equate with power: Control of security, media and business outlets does." Since last year's Gongadze scandal, it has been to President Leonid Kuchma's great advantage to curry Russian support. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, grateful for Russian support, the United States and Western Europeans need a new strategy regarding Ukraine's cozying up to Russia. After all, integrating Russia into NATO is a U. S. priority. Consequently, President Kuchma's moves toward Russia have paid off. Recently, following a meeting with Putin, Kuchma suggested the need for "closer integration of the former Soviet republics."[37] Russia and Ukraine have completed draft agreements detailing "interaction on the arms markets of third countries," undertaking "research in the development of new weapons," and setting up "cooperation in repairing, modernizing and testing warships of the two countries."[38] Additionally, ITAR-TASS has reported that Russia soon will begin "upgrading MiG-29s for the Ukrainian Air Force to MiG-29 SMT."[39]
There is much that the American administration can do to help the people of Ukraine achieve their human rights. A step in the right direction was the recent U. S. cut in aid to Ukraine. Ukraine will receive $21 million less from the United States' foreign-aid budget during 2002, and may sustain further cuts if the government fails to make progress toward solving the unsolved killings of Georgiy Gongadze and regional TV channel director Ihor Oleksandrov. A compromise foreign-aid budget passed on Dec. 20, 2001 includes a 12 percent cut in funds earmarked for Ukraine. The appropriation of $154 million is significantly less than the $180 million the U. S. Senate had wanted to spend, and more than the $125 million proposed by the U. S. House of Representatives. The House proposed a drastic spending cut last July, citing a lack of progress toward reforms and sluggish investigations into journalists' murders. The Senate, however, wanted to increase aid by $5 million over the 2001 level.
The joint House-Senate conference committee conference report attached to the foreign-operations bill earmarked at least $30 million for nuclear safety initiatives and made it clear that the aid package depends on the government's efforts to track down and punish the murderers of journalists. The State Department is required to report Ukraine's progress investigating and "bringing to justice individuals responsible for murders of Ukrainian journalists" to the House Appropriations Committee no later than 60 days after the bill became law. The report did not specify how Congress will evaluate Ukraine's progress or how aid may be affected.[40]
The U. S. can intensify support for civil society, democracy, and human-rights campaigns in Ukraine and not just support and re-support the elite. It can provide more opportunities for more young Ukrainian professionals to work in American institutions, and not just award the same "insider" people over and over again just because they speak the best English. It should oblige grantees to share their knowledge with other Ukrainians. It can embrace more strongly those who want open, democratic and humane systems for their own societies; and stop supporting only those who want to travel and study abroad, but do not share knowledge or network with other Ukrainians. Poverty and scarcity erode people's willingness to share. The US can counteract this by spreading its programs to benefit more Ukrainians, not just those few who speak English and have pals in the right places.
One undertaking of the U. S. that would benefit Ukraine would be supporting enhanced use of the Internet in Ukraine. Very few of my law students had the money for home Internet, which placed them at a tremendous disadvantage internationally and against the insider Ukrainians. The university's Internet connection was slow, unreliable and unworkable. Numerous grants for a better Internet connection were denied, as funding is now going to training. That will only empower those insiders more against the ordinary people. More money has to go to decent machines and connections for many more people before training can have any impact. In advancing human rights and civil society in Ukraine the role of the Internet is crucial. Thanks to the Internet, the problems of geographic remoteness and the prohibitive costs of communications have been virtually eliminated for those countries who have it. International networks can be formed swiftly and vast amounts of information exchanged at little or no expense--"dial locally, act internationally" as Jessica Mathews puts it.[32] Global civil society's response rate has risen dramatically, especially by human-rights groups who within hours of the occurrence of an event galvanize responses from around the world. The growth of international movements has been such that in some areas they have come to dwarf their counterparts within the UN system. Amnesty International, for example, is now better resourced than is the human rights arm of the UN.
The Net vastly improves the means by which Human Rights concerns can be reported, reflected upon and shared. With freedom of expression, human-rights violators can no longer rely on hiding their acts from public knowledge. The U. S. should foster the use of the Internet in Ukraine by enhancing increased access to it through libraries, service providers, schools and the training of individuals to use it. Ukraine needs this capability greatly. That way, if the insiders will not share information and resources with Ukrainians, they can find it on the Internet. (See the forthcoming article on The State of The Internet in Ukraine by this author). All of this can enhance freedom of expression in Ukraine, a fundamental foundation of liberty in any society.
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Footnotes:
[1] While 13 journalists have been killed in Ukraine in the past five years, the Georgiy Gongadze case was a pivotal event. The murder of this young on-line journalist, who reported corruption of the regime in power, aroused awareness overseas as to the seriousness of threats to individual liberties in Ukraine.
[2] Ukraine: A Briefing for the Human Rights Committee, September 2001, AI Index: EUR 50/002/2001.
[3] EPF307 03/14/01 Text: NPR's Kevin Klose on Freedom of Expression and the Media (March 12: OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, Vienna) (2140). "The state has no place in the newsroom," Kevin Klose told the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting in Vienna . United States Mission to the OSCE Vienna March 12, 2001.
[5] Reporters sans frontieres, "La verite mutilte: Enquete sur l'assassinat du journaliste Georgiy Gongadze,' Rapport rendu public le 22 janvier 2001; available at http:// www.rsf.fr. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists came to the same conclusion.
[6] In April of 2000, at Kuchma's initiative, Ukrainians voted to amend the Ukrainian constitution to give the president rights to disband the parliament, eliminate parliamentary immunity, and cut the number of parliamentary deputies from 450 to 300. During this period, the backing of Kuchma was solid owing to his blackmailing control of state power organs. Conversely, parliament was regarded as an ineffective body. See The NIS Observed, http://www.bu.edu/iscip, 18 Jan 2000 and 4 April 2000.
[7] Kyiv Post, November 28, 2001.
[8] "Statement of Scholars and Professionals on the Current Crisis in Ukraine" (March 2001); "Press Release Regarding the 'Statement', March 13, 2001, http://www.ukrainianstudies.org/petition.htm.
[9] Resolution 1239 (2001), "Freedom of Expression and the Functioning of Parliamentary Democracy in Ukraine," adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 January 2001, paragraph 2.
[10] Ibid, paragraphs 6 (ii) and 6 (iii)
[11] Resolution 1244 (2001), "Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine," adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 April 2001, paragraph 5; See also The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, "Statement to the Permanent Council," 8 February 2001, p. 3.
[12] Dominique Arel, "Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's 'Geopolitical Bluff'," East European Constitutional Review, v. 10, n. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001),http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num2_3/focus/arel.html.
[13] The absence of independent and impartial tribunals is considered a violation of human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974) (establishing the right of all persons to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination of criminal charges or of rights and obligations in any suit at law); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc.21, rev.6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) ("Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, previously established by law in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.").
[14] Tammy Lynch, "Kuchmagate's Collateral Damage," Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol11/lynch.html.
[15] "Ukraine Constitutional Watch," EECR, v. 10, n. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num2_3/constitutionwatch/ukraine.html; See also Adrian Karatnycky, "Meltdown in Ukraine," Foreign Affairs, 73-86 (May/June 2001).
[16] Ibid.
[17] For a description of the ongoing political crisis, see "Ukraine Update," EECR, v. 10, n. 1 (Winter 2001).
[18] http://kpnews.com/main/9966/.
[19] Civil society is referred to as the sum total of those organizations and networks which lie outside the formal state apparatus. It includes the whole gamut of organizations that are traditionally labeled "interest groups"--not just NGOs, but also labor unions, professional associations, chambers of commerce, religions, student groups, cultural societies, sports clubs and informal community groups.
[20] "The objective of western civil-society programs should be to foster groupings of individuals joined by mutual understanding of common problems for which they proposed common solutions," said Alexandra Hrycak, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Reed College, at a Kennan Institute lecture on 30 October 2000. Hrycak explained that these groupings, or "publics," are important in western countries in a variety of policy domains. However, in Ukraine, policy-making is disconnected from government accountability, and groups have been unable to cooperate or form coalitions around common agendas. Western programs can encourage regular interaction among groups and thereby help build effective community organizations through which citizens might better influence politics. Hrycak suggested that the western community to date has focused more on providing assistance and training from the outside. She noted that it is difficult to determine the extent to which these programs have been able to foster networks of cooperation in Ukraine, since evaluations tend to focus on quantitative measures, such as the amount of groups created or individuals trained. This focus has led, Hrycak contended, to ephemeral organizations that focus on self-perpetuation and on creating the possibilities for future grants. In order to do so, they tend to focus on publishing activities, and are not able to create a public for themselves or their issues. (http://wwics.si.edu/kennan/reports/2001/hrycak.htm).
[21] "Ukraine Constitutional Watch," EECR, v. 10, n. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num2_3/constitutionwatch/ukraine.html.
[22] British Helsinki Human Rights Group, "Ukraine 2001: Demonstrations and Political Crisis," http://www.bhhrg.org/ukraine/ukraine2001/kuchmagate/contents.htm.
[23] http://www.bhhrg.org/ukraine/ukraine2001/kuchmagate/chapter%202.htm
[24] British Helsinki Human Rights Group, "Ukraine 2001: Demonstrations and Political Crisis," http://www.bhhrg.org/ukraine/ukraine2001/kuchmagate/contents.htm; See also Dominique Arel, "Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's 'Geopolitical Bluff'," EECR, v. 10, n. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001).
[25] http://kpnews.com/forum/6/closed/readpost/288/0/. Citizens, colleagues and students in Ukraine told me that none of the elite donor organizations listen to these people. They just listen to each other. And yet, these ordinary people are their best consultants and the stakeholders.
[26] "International Helsinki Federation Annual Report 2001," p. 323.
[27] "Ukraine before the United Nations," Amnesty International 15 October 2001 AI Index: EUR 50/001/200. The Council of Europe's observation team called the election campaign "a disgrace" and a breach of Ukraine's commitments to the OSCE and its obligations under the European Human Rights Convention. One sentence unceremoniously captured the spirit of the report: "Our verdict of the campaign is totally negative." Ad Hoc Committee to Observe the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, "Report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe," October 31 and November 14, 1999, Doc. 8603, December, 21 1999; available at www.coe.fr. Dominique Arel, op. cit.
27.5 On August 3, 2001, the United States Senate passed a concurrent resolution in recognition of Ukraine's Independence. The resolution passed by unanimous consent, and now awaits review in the House of Representatives. S.CON.RES. 62. The resolution came just three weeks before the August 24th Ukrainian Independence Day, celebrated by Ukrainians throughout the world. Ukraine achieved its independence from the Soviet Union by a parliamentary vote on August 24, 1991. According to the resolution, "the United States congratulates the people of Ukraine on their tenth anniversary of independence." The resolution also recognizes the democratic triumphs of Ukraine, evidenced in the statement that "the United States, having recognized Ukraine as an independent state on December 25, 1991, and having established diplomatic relations with Ukraine on January 2, 1992," would strive toward the long-term goal of creating a strategic partnership with Ukraine. Additionally, when "in July 1994, Ukraine's presidential election marked the first peaceful and democratic transfer of executive power among the independent states of the former Soviet Union, [and] five years ago, on June 28, 1996, Ukraine's parliament voted to adopt a Ukrainian Constitution," Ukraine displayed its dedication to permanent U. S. relations. This year marks the tenth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, and is regarded as a landmark year in its democratic development. The resolution primarily focuses on the accomplishments of Ukraine during its first ten years in the social and economic realms. Ukraine has been a regional leader in settling internal ethnic conflict, as noted by the resolution: "Ukraine has been a paragon of interethnic cooperation and harmony, as evidenced by the OSCE's and the United States State Department's annual human rights reports." The economy of Ukraine has taken a huge leap forward in the past 18 months, thanks to a reformist economic policy, which allowed significant growth. The resolution acknowledges this and states, "Ukraine, through the efforts of its government, has reversed the downward trend in its economy, experiencing the first real economic growth since its independence, [and] furthered the privatization of its economy through the privatization of agricultural land in 2001." The Senate also recognizes Ukraine's participation in exercises with KFOR, IFOR, various international peacekeeping missions, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, saying in the resolution, "Ukraine has found many methods to implement military cooperation with its European neighbors." Additionally, Ukraine has been a world leader in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, stating, "Ukraine has taken major steps to stem world nuclear proliferation by ratifying the START I Treaty on nuclear disarmament and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Besides congratulating Ukraine, the resolution also expresses the Sense of Congress to advise Ukraine to "continue to enact political reforms necessary" and "promote fundamental democratic principles." The reforms enacted in Ukraine have made the environment for a free market economy and civic society much more tenable, but certain problems still exist, especially in terms of the transparency of government activities. Corruption and political cronyism still play a major roll in Ukrainian politics. It was also the Sense of Congress that Ukraine should "actively pursue in an open and transparent fashion investigations into violence committed against journalists." Two prominent journalists, Heorhiy Gongadze and Ihor Oleksandrov, were killed in the past year. The Sense of Congress asked Ukraine to "uphold international standards and procedures of free and fair elections," "transform its economy into one founded upon free market principles and governed by the rule of law," "and follow a westward leaning foreign policy." These are especially important issues in Ukraine right now, as the upcoming parliamentary elections could decide the fate of the nation. For this reason, the U. S. is strongly encouraging President Kuchma and his administration not to interfere with the elections. In order to do so, the resolution states it is the Sense of Congress that "the United States supports all efforts to promote a civil society in Ukraine that features a vibrant community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and an active, independent, and free press." Upon its acceptance, the final resolution was sent to President George W. Bush, who is required to send it to the government of Ukraine. The Senate Resolution was proposed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).
[28] "United States Congressional Resolution on Tenth Anniversary of Independence of Ukraine August 3, 2001." There is no mention here of human rights problems.
[29] "International Helsinki Federation Annual Report, 2001."
[30] "International Helsinki Federation Annual Report 2001."
[31] Amnesty International reports that the violent abuse, torture and ill-treatment of conscripted soldiers in the Ukrainian army is widespread. Officers of the armed forces continue to tolerate, permit, and sometimes participate in dedovshchina, the violent and cruel hazing of young recruits, which includes beatings, torture and murder. In Ukraine conscription is compulsory and recruits normally are obliged to serve for a period of 18 months. New recruits have frequently complained of their torture and ill-treatment. "Ukraine before the United Nations" Human Rights Amnesty International, 15 October 2001, AI Index: EUR 50/001/200.1
[32] Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66.
[33] http://www.kpnews.com. October 23, 2001.
[34] UNIAN, 1412 GMT, 2 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
[35] Tammy Lynch, "Western Region: Ukraine: Back to Old Times," http://www.bu.edu/iscip/news.html#western.
[36] Keith A. Darden, "The Stability of a 'Blackmail State'," East European Constitutional Review, v. 10, n. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num2_3/focus/darden.html.
[37] ITAR-TASS, 1510 GMT, 29 Nov 01; Federal News Service, via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
[38] ITAR-TASS, 1434 GMT, 1 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1201, via World News Connection.
[39] ITAR-TASS, 1312 GMT, 3 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection.
[40] See http://www.kpnews.com/main/10324/.
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