aaus-list @ ukrainianstudies.org -- Re: [aaus-list] anybody interested in chiming in?

[Alexandra Hrycak <hrycaka@reed.edu>]

I am also finding this exchange stimulating and thought-provoking. I see 
from Adrian's reply that he asks us to take a close look at the pattern 
of behavior exhibited by the Yanukovych administration over this half 
year. Doing so, he says, we will see that Ukrainians are "tired of 
protesting" (but that they still possess the inalienable right to 
demonstrations), we will also see that a lot of Ukrainians are happy 
with Yanukovych, etc.

Let's consider an opposing perspective, that of one of Ukraine's leading 
human rights advocates. Yevhen Zakharov is the head of the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Human Rights Union and co-chair of the Kharkiv Human Rights 
Group.  Zakharov is arguably  one of Ukraine's leading human rights 
monitors. He believes that there is considerable evidence that the new 
administration is using the Interior ministry to impose authoritarian 
controls on Ukraine; he also notes that these are in violation of 
Ukrainian law (we can add, these actions also contradict Ukrainian 
obligations under its international human rights treaties). Z

Zakharov finds that a disturbing reversal of the Interior Ministry's 
prior stance on human rights has come about since the election. Zakharov 
makes a sound and very convincing case for viewing the state as having 
undertaken an authoritarian crackdown on basic civil liberties.

I would be interested in hearing more from Adrian or others who view the 
Yanukovych administration's human rights record with favor. Zakharov's 
recent article in the Kyiv Post has me convinced otherwise. Since his 
article provides evidence suggesting that we should not buy Adrian's 
argument that democracy is not in peril, I will here sum up the main 
points Zakharov makes (for the full article, see "Assault on human 
rights under way," 
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/77090/).


1.  The current minister appears to have closed off access points human 
rights groups were using to monitor the behavior of the Interior 
Ministry. In 2005, within the Interior Ministry a Public Council on 
Human Rights was created under then-Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, 
co-chaired by Zakharov. He states that this body regularly met and did a 
great deal of work over the past 5 years, but it has not been permitted 
to meet since Mohylyov became the new Interior minister.

2. A recent directive increases the powers of Interior Ministry 
officials by calling for “constant control over the stay of foreign 
nationals on service structures, carry out thorough checks of foreign 
nationals’ documents, give particular attention to whether they have 
registration cards issued by border guards.”

- Zakharov points out that this order is in violation of existing laws, 
which forbids such categorical surveillance. It also helps to place the 
detention of Lange into a broader perspective - as Oksana notes, we can 
see that Lange is no isolated incident but rather, part of a broader 
policy of using state surveillance against foreigners.

3. A new directive restricts freedom of movement and introduces Soviet 
style surveillance: according to Instruction No. 292 from April 23, 
railways are to re-introduce obligations that ticket sales require 
passengers to provide  full names, dates of birth, and the number of a 
person’s ID. Such data were in the Soviet era commonly used against 
groups or persons critical of the government. This type of surveilance 
is in violation of  rights to privacy and reintroduces state 
surveillance over one of Ukraine's most common forms of public 
transportation.

Broadly, Zakharov makes a case that gross violations of the right to 
peaceful assembly have been observed on a staggering scale: Zakharov 
points out that 350 articles have appeared in the media criticizing how 
the police handled peaceful gatherings, such as protests. In other 
words, in less than half a year, more media criticism of state 
repression of public demonstrations has appeared than in the three 
previous years (2007, 2008, 2009). He also expresses concern over recent 
evidence of a resurgence in violence used against detainees ("From June 
11-14 alone, four deaths were reported as a result of police actions. 
Another victim ended up in emergency care.")


Zahkarov provides examples of systematic human rights violations 
resulting from the Interior Minister's own new policies and troubling 
signs that the Ukrainian state is once again using the police to impose 
new (Soviet style) forms of surveillance over citizens as well as 
foreign nationals, thus inhibiting freedom of movement, freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly. Why would he write this if 
everything was good with the state of democracy in Ukraine?

Oxana Shevel, Prof. wrote:
> This is a very stimulating and thought-provoking exchange. I will be 
> assigning both articles to my students.
> 
> As for the question of Yanukovych's regime democratic credentials, I too 
> no longer believe that he deserves the benefit of the doubt. My question 
> to Adrian and others who may still do would be what exactly would have 
> to happen before you can stop calling the actions of the government 
> democratic.  Banning demonstrations all together is not ok but blocking 
> demonstrators by police in a side street is ok? Firing professors not ok 
> but having rectors sign promises to SBU that they would mind their 
> students' political activities is ok? It is easy to take any one 
> instance in isolation (be it TV channel licensing, SBU visit to rectors, 
> obstruction of demonstrators, detainment of Lange, blogger harassment, 
> you name it) and try to convince yourself that this is just an isolated 
> incident, just the overzealous lower level actors, while good democrat 
> Yanukovych says how he's angered by it, etc. In other words, is your 
> belief in Yanukovych's democratic credential even falsifiable, and if so 
> how exactly?
> 
> I catch myself doing thought experiments: could something like this 
> happen in the US? In Poland? In Ukraine under Yushchenko? Sadly, the 
> answer is often no. To my mind, the fact that Yanukovych says that he 
> supports democracy is meaningless.  All autocrats claim to be democrats.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Oxana
> 
> ajmotyl@andromeda.rutgers.edu wrote:
>> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
>> Subject: Re: Why Yanukovych Does Not Deserve the Benefit of the
>> From:    "Adrian Karatnycky" <akaratnycky@gmail.com>
>> Date:    Fri, August 20, 2010 12:24 pm
>> To:      ajmotyl@andromeda.rutgers.edu
>>          jjoyner@acus.org
>>          "Fred Kempe" <fkempe@acus.org>
>>          "Damon Wilson" <dwilson@acus.org>
>>          "Fran Burwell" <fburwell@acus.org>
>>          "Cynthia Romero" <cromero@acus.org>
>> Cc:      "Nadia Kizenko" <kizenko@albany.edu>
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Alex and James,
>>
>> Here is my response to Alex's comments. I think this makes for an
>> interesting ACUS debate. Hope you can post my response alongside Alex's
>> Comments.
>>
>> Adrian Karatnycky’s Response to Alexander Motyl:
>>
>>
>>
>> In his rejoinder to my recent *American Interest* article, “Orange Peels,”
>> my good friend Alexander Motyl claims he and other critics of Ukraine’s
>> President  Viktor Yanukovych gave him the benefit of the doubt.
>>
>>
>>
>> For the record, Motyl’s benefit of the doubt did not last long. Within five
>> weeks of the inauguration Ukraine’s new President, Motyl wrote that
>> Yanukovych: “has committed a series of mistakes that could doom his
>> presidency, scare off foreign investors and thwart the country’s
>> modernization. Yanukovych’s misrule is courting a second Orange Revolution.”
>> So much for a honeymoon for the new president and his  then three-week-old
>> government.
>>
>>
>>
>> Motyl is correct that voters did give Yanukovych the benefit of the doubt.
>> They continue to do so. He enjoys approval ratings of over 60 percent, an
>> improvement over his 50 percent level of support in the presidential vote.
>> That means that today, well over 20 percent of Yulia Tymoshenko voters are
>> pleased with Yanukovych’s performance.
>>
>>
>>
>> Motyl asserts that “Yanukovych and his party have proceeded to dismantle
>> democracy—violating the Constitution in order to acquire a parliamentary
>> majority, transforming the Parliament into a rubber-stamp institution,
>> encroaching on freedom of assembly and speech, passing a law on local
>> elections that guarantees a Party of Regions monopoly of power, encroaching
>> on academic autonomy, and activating both the Security Service and the
>> Ministry of Internal Affairs.
>>
>>
>>
>> I believe we can agree that Ukraine’s constitution and its court system are
>> flawed.  However, Yanukovych’s alleged steps against the constitution were
>> no less problematic than the reality that for well over a year the
>> Tymoshenko government held on to power with the support of less than half
>> the legislators in parliament. Moreover, on March 1, 243 legislators voted
>> for the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government, a clear affirmation of the
>> will of that sitting body.
>>
>>
>>
>> More significantly, after the vote for a new government was taken, President
>> Yanukovych told European Union representatives that "If the decision of the
>> Constitutional Court will be that the coalition was formed illegally, then I
>> will take a decision on a snap election, I will never go down the path of
>> breaching the constitution that is in force.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Many critics of the decision assert that the Constitutional Court itself is
>> subject to political influence and pressures and, so, lacks legitimacy. But
>> if one argues that Ukraine’s entire legal system is illegitimate, one must
>> also agree that the same “illegitimate” court system took the decision to
>> hold a re-run of the tainted presidential election of 2004 that sparked the
>> Orange Revolution.
>>
>>
>>
>> The reality is that today no fewer than 260 out of 450 legislators support
>> the current government.  While imperfect, this clear majority is a better
>> outcome than a situation in which a de facto minority Tymoshenko government
>> held on for over a year despite the fact that well over half the deputies in
>> the legislature supported its dismissal.
>>
>>
>>
>> Indeed, is it not more logical that Ukraine has a government which enjoys
>> the support of 260 deputies than one that could have hung on with the
>> support of a mere 115 deputies? Bear in mind, that under the interpretation
>> of Ukraine’s Constitution offered by the opposition, a government could
>> remain in office if it retained the backing of a majority of deputies, whose
>> fractions together account for a majority. That would have meant that a
>> majority (78) of 155 deputies from the Tymoshenko bloc and a majority (37)
>> of  72 deputies from the Our Ukraine bloc could have continued to claim they
>> represent a legitimate majority of 227.  Under such circumstances, we can
>> agree that the Constitutional Court’s ruling was at the very least not a
>> dilution of democracy as it existed prior to Yanukovych’s election.
>>
>>
>>
>> While I agree that a new election would have been preferable, I can also see
>> why given the fact that Ukraine faced a growing economic crisis, President
>> Yanukovych felt he could not delay moving forward without an effective
>> government. A new election would likely have put off the creation of such a
>> government for a further 4-5 months.
>>
>>
>>
>> On other issues, Prof. Motyl is simply wrong. Academic freedom has not been
>> infringed upon sytematically. Under Yanukovych, not a single professor has
>> lost his teaching post in Ukraine’s universities. A widely publicized visit
>> by a low level security service functionary to the rector of Ukraine’s
>> Catholic University contained no discussion of academic matters and was soon
>> followed up by a contrite visit by the head of the Security Service to clear
>> the air.
>>
>>
>>
>> Demonstrations remain an inalienable right of Ukrainians, though the
>> proposition has not yet been tested as most Ukrainians are for the moment
>> tired of protesting. It is true there has been excesses by the Ministry of
>> Interior in policing demonstrations (mostly keeping demonstrators at a
>> distance from President Yanukovych for “safety” reasons), but these excesses
>> resulted in the Minister of the Interior being called on the carpet by
>> President Yanukovych and sternly rebuked for such actions.
>>
>>
>>
>> As for a rubber-stamp parliament, I see no such thing. There is reasonable
>> diversity of views within the party of Regions and between the coalition
>> members with pro-free market and more statist currents both represented.
>> There is also a healthy rivalry for influence between factions in the Party
>> of Regions that are jockeying for influence. The current state of politics
>> in the government and legislature is hardly one of monolithic rule.
>>
>>
>>
>> And in the case of press freedom, there is plenty of it. Opposition forces
>> are seen regularly on the major TV stations, and the news and information
>> content of the major channels belonging to billionaires Viktor Pinchuk and
>> Rinat Akhmetov reveal a high degree of balance and professionalism in
>> coverage.
>>
>>
>>
>> While the most popular channel Inter has a pro-government bent, its tilt is
>> no different from the partisan bent observed on the US’s  (conservative) Fox
>> News channel and on (liberal) CNBC.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don’t think much needs to be said about Motyl’s comment comparing
>> Yanukovych’s  moderate policies “with Hitler’s Gleichschaltung in 1933.” It
>> merely confirms my thesis of the excessive rhetoric adopted by normally
>> sober analysts of Ukraine’s politics.
>>
>>
>>
>> On the matter of culture, I am in broad agreement with Motyl. We both
>> disagree fundamentally with the Ukrainophobic policies of Education Minister
>> Dmytro Tabachnyk and with the naming of a Stalin apologist as head of the
>> Institute of National Memory, I still believe that these odious appointments
>> can and will be reversed. Nevertheless, I think that Yanukovych is right in
>> trying to ensuree a hospitable environment for Ukraine’s Russian-speakers.
>> Such steps, in my view, are likely to deepen their support for Ukraine’s
>> statehood.
>>
>>
>>
>> However, I do not agree with Motyl that Ukraine is threatened by the
>> presence of a couple dozen Russian security services agents who are attached
>> to the Russian Black Sea Fleet and have been allowed to be present on the
>> peninsula.
>>
>>
>>
>> And I fundamentally disagree with Motyl’s assertion that Yanukovych is
>> eroding Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence.
>>
>>
>>
>> Indeed, by stabilizing and normalizing relations with Russia, renewing
>> sensible Russian investment in Ukraine (while at times blocking takeovers
>> that are not in the national interest), securing a cheaper price for natural
>> gas, and renewing and expanding cooperation with the International Monetary
>> Fund, Yanukovych is creating a stronger Ukrainian economy better able to
>> defend its sovereign interests. His planned September visits to Asia and the
>> US (UN General Assembly) are also aimed at diversifying and increasing
>> international investment in Ukraine’s economy.
>>
>>
>>
>> As for economic reform, the presidential team has developed a serious,
>> sequenced plan of reform that is to be introduced gradually over the next
>> couple years. It will include speeded up privatizations, investment
>> promotion initiatives, and, most likely, land privatization.  All that
>> sounds like a serious agenda to me.
>>
>>
>>
>> And on the matter of corruption, Yanukovych’s government has already moved
>> against high level corruption in the Kyiv mayoralty (which was controlled
>> his political allies), and arrested his Deputy Environment Minister, his
>> regional,  and a mid-level Presidential Administration official all for
>> alleged corruption.
>>
>>
>>
>> On balance, while not a sterling record, Yanukovych’s half year in office is
>> hardly one of misrule. He has taken a reasonably effective set of steps in a
>> variety of policy areas, while making some serious mistakes in the
>> educational and cultural spheres.
>>
>>
>>
>> On some matters, President Yanukovych has acted intelligently and erased
>> doubts. He therefore has earned the benefit of our doubt in those areas
>> where he has fallen short.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 6:09 AM, <ajmotyl@andromeda.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>
>>   
>>> Forthcoming on The Atlantic Council website, www.acus.org:
>>>
>>> Too Little, Too Late: Why Yanukovych Does Not Deserve the Benefit of the
>>> Doubt
>>>
>>> Alexander J. Motyl
>>>
>>> Adrian Karatnycky’s article, “Orange Peels: Ukraine after Revolution,” was
>>> written about six months too late. Had it appeared back in February 2010,
>>> Karatnycky’s analysis—and his suggestion that Ukraine’s President Viktor
>>> Yanukovych “deserves the benefit of our doubt”—would have been right on
>>> target.
>>>
>>> Indeed, what Karatnycky fails to mention is that Yanukovych was given the
>>> benefit of the doubt by most Western and Ukrainian analysts (me included)
>>> and a significant portion of the Ukrainian electorate. Recall that some
>>> 4.5 percent of voters (most of whom were from the Orange camp that
>>> supported former President Viktor Yushchenko) voted against both Yulia
>>> Tymoshenko and Yanukovych in the final round of the presidential ballot,
>>> effectively giving their vote to the latter and providing him with the
>>> margin of victory he needed to win.
>>>
>>> The rationale employed by those of us who gave Yanukovych the “benefit of
>>> the doubt” was precisely that outlined by Karatnycky. We believed that
>>> five years of opposition would have led Yanukovych and his authoritarian
>>> Party of Regions to shed their authoritarian inclinations and embrace
>>> democracy. We also believed Yanukovych’s promise that he would be a
>>> moderate, promote the unity of the country, appoint only professionals,
>>> and pursue economic reform. After all, with such a narrow margin of
>>> victory, how could he do otherwise?
>>>
>>> Boy, were we ever wrong.
>>>
>>> The vast majority of democratically inclined analysts and Ukrainians have
>>> now turned against Yanukovych—and with a vengeance. Why? Karatnycky
>>> suggests that “such overheated analysis … stems from three sources: the
>>> myths and realities of the Orange Revolution, Leonid Kuchma’s
>>> authoritarian rule, and the myths surrounding the emergence of vast
>>> fortunes in Ukraine in the late 1990s. And aside from these three sources,
>>> there is also the Grand Guignol mudslinging style of Ukrainian politics.”
>>>
>>> Nothing could be further from the truth.
>>>
>>> The reality is that Yanukovych has violated every single one of his
>>> promises. And those of us who gave him the “benefit of the doubt” feel
>>> betrayed.
>>>
>>> Yanukovych and his party have proceeded to dismantled democracy—violating
>>> the Constitution in order to acquire a parliamentary majority,
>>> transforming the Parliament into a rubber-stamp institution, encroaching
>>> on freedom of assembly and speech, passing a law on local elections that
>>> guarantees a Party of Regions monopoly of power, encroaching on academic
>>> autonomy, and activating both the Security Service and the Ministry of
>>> Internal Affairs. In addition, Yanukovych has launched a full-scale
>>> assault on Ukrainian language, culture, and identity—thereby negating his
>>> own claims of wanting to promote the unity of the country—and turned
>>> Ukraine toward Russia, so much so that he tolerates the revival of
>>> Stalinist rhetoric and Russian revanchism in Ukraine, as well as the
>>> return to the Crimea of the Russian security service. And all of this—the
>>> assault on democracy, the assault on Ukrainian identity, and the turn
>>> toward Russia—have been accomplished in just a few months. So much for
>>> moderation! Not moderates, but radicals act this quickly, this
>>> comprehensively, this fundamentally. Indeed, the comparison with Hitler’s
>>> Gleichschaltung in 1933 comes to mind. Recall that he too came to power in
>>> a fair and free election…
>>>
>>> Worse still, as Karatnycky implies, most of Yanukovych administration
>>> consists of Soviet-style managers at best and incompetents at worst.  The
>>> people in Yanukovych’s supposed inner circle—Serhii Lovochkin, Irina
>>> Akimova, Hanna Herman, and Serhii Tihipko (even if the wonder boys and
>>> girls that Karatnycky implies they are)—are only four individuals compared
>>> to a retrograde cabinet of ministers consisting of just under 30
>>> anti-professionals. Lovochkin and Herman, moreover, are widely considered
>>> to be opportunists, while Tihipko is rumored to be on the verge of
>>> quitting or getting fired as the fall guy for the government’s economic
>>> failures. That leaves, perhaps, Akimova as the sole member possibly having
>>> lasting reformist credentials on Yanukovych’s putative team.
>>>
>>> Then there’s the question of economic reform. One could argue, I suppose,
>>> that dismantling democracy might be the price one has to pay for bold
>>> economic change. Alas, the simple fact is that, after almost half a year
>>> in office, Yanukovych has delivered absolutely nothing. True, he’s signed
>>> a deal with the IMF, but so would have Tymoshenko or Yushchenko. The
>>> government’s budget is widely considered to be a sham. The economic plan
>>> consists mostly of generalities. Corruption is as rampant as it used to
>>> be: indeed, Yanukovych acquired his own estate in a questionable manner.
>>>
>>> Most telling is the Tax Code, which absolutely everyone—even members of
>>> the Party of Regions—agrees is a disaster. In the meantime, the government
>>> has begun extorting taxes from small and medium enterprises. All of this
>>> retrograde behavior was perfectly predictable when Yanukovych appointed
>>> the notorious Mykola Azarov as prime minister. Azarov, after all, is known
>>> for his inability to think in market terms and, back in the days of
>>> President Kuchma, squeezed entrepreneurs in the same manner that he is
>>> doing today.
>>>
>>> Last but not least, there’s Yanukovych himself. Karatnycky believes in his
>>> make-over. True, Yanukovych often says the right things. But more often
>>> than not, he also says the wrong things—like defining democracy as
>>> “order”—and, of course, engaging in more gaffes than even George W. Bush.
>>> But his statements, like his new haircut, and his having mastered
>>> Ukrainian are neither here nor there. Politicians should be measured by
>>> what they do—not what they say.
>>>
>>> And Yanukovych’s record is quite clear: he’s done nothing constructive,
>>> while accomplishing an enormous number of positively destructive things.
>>> If one cares about democracy and the market in an independent Ukraine,
>>> that is.
>>>
>>> A politician with that kind of record no longer deserves the benefit of
>>> the doubt. He deserves our prayers. And so does the country he’s
>>> misruling.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     
>>
>>
>>   
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
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>>   
> 
> -- 
> Oxana Shevel
> Assistant Professor
> Tufts University
> Department of Political Science
> Packard Hall, 4 The Green
> Medford, MA 02155
> USA
> 
> Email: oxana.shevel@tufts.edu
> https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/~osheve01 
> Tel: 617-627-2658
> Fax: 617-627-3660
> 
> Fall 2010 office hours: Wed 2-4pm, and by appointment
> 
> 
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-- 
**************************

Alexandra Hrycak
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
Reed College
3203 SE Woodstock Blvd.
Portland, Oregon 97202-8199


E-mail: hrycak@reed.edu		
Telephone: 503-517-7483 		
Fax: 503-777-7776 		
Personal web page: http://academic.reed.edu/sociology/faculty/hrycak/